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COMMERCIAL CODE LITIGATION: CONFLICTS OF LAW;
SALES
BY LOUIS F. DEL DUCA*
This article is the first of a series which will comment onl the cases
reported to date in which the Uniform Commercial Code has been applied
to operative facts occurring after its effective date.1 Pennsylvania is still the
only state which has had the Code in effect long enough to enable courts to
hand down such decisions. The Code in its original form was in force in
Pennsylvania for five and one-half years when, on January 1, 1960, it was
superseded by the current edition.2 This current edition has been enacted
in ten other states3 and is pending before legislatures of several others.
It is accurate to say that during the past seven years Pennsylvania has
provided an "insulated chamber"4 for experimentation with the Uniform
Commercial Code. During this time only 102 such decisions have been
reported by the courts. Of this number six (6) were decided by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, fourteen (14) by the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania (a court of intermediate appellate jurisdiction), one (1) by the
Court of Chancery of Delaware applying Pennsylvania law, four (4) by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and ten (10) by the Federal District
Courts in Pennsylvania. Sixty-seven (67) cases are trial court cases which
in some jurisdictions are not reported. Such a volume of litigation over a
7Y2 year period, encompassing an area of the law as far reaching as the Code,
is not excessive for an industrial-commercial-agricultural complex the size
of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's experience is certainly not evidence of the
avalanche of litigation and confusion anticipated by some who were fearful
of the lack of predictability which might result from the use of new termi-
* A.B., 1950, Temple University; LL.B., 1952, Harvard University; 1953, Hague
Academy of International Law; L.L.D., 1954, University of Rome; Professor of Law,
Dickinson School of Law; member Pennsylvania Bar; Consultant to Department of
Revenue, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth.
1. Most states enacting the U.C.C. will probably experience a one or two year
period within which the cases arising in their courts will involve facts occurring prior
to the effective date of the U.C.C. and, therefore, require application of prior uniform
acts and case law. Such cases are excluded from this study.
2. The U.C.C. was initially enacted in Pennsylvania on April 6, 1953: 1 Pa. Stats.,
1953, Act. No. 1 § 1-101-10-104. It provided in § 10-101 for an effective date of
July 1, 1954. The original enactment was based upon the 1952 Text and Com-
ments Edition of the Code prepared by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Pursuant to sugges-
tions largely originating from the New York Law Revision Commission and the
Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce, a substantial number of revisions, mostly clarifica-
tion, but a few substantive, were made thereto. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101-
10-104 (Supp. 1959) (accord, U.C.C. §§ 1-101-10-104 (1958)).
3. Ark., Conn., Ky., Mass., N.H., N.M., Ohio, Ore., R.I., and Wyo.
4. Justice Holmes in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 343.
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nology and concepts which had not been tested and refined by case law
under the earlier uniform acts. 5
The commentary which follows is not intended to be in the form of a
systematic code treatise, but rather a systematic analysis of litigated cases.
Treatise type section by section analysis can be found in the Code comments, 6
the various American Law Institute and American Bar Association studies,7
the New York Law Revision Commission Report s and studies which prior
to enactment of the Code have been prepared by states setting forth section
by section comparisions between the Code and local law. 9 To facilitate refer-
ence and make for an orderly presentation the analysis of the cases which
follows is arranged in the same sequence as the Articles and Parts of the
Code.10 The first installment of this article deals with the sales and selected
conflicts of law litigation.
ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Territorial application of Act; Parties Power to choose applicable law
The conflicts of law provisions of the Code are basically set forth in
Section 1-105. This provision gives the parties the right to choose the ap-
plicable law"1 subject to those provisions which make mandatory the appli-
5. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN PENNSYLVANIA 1954-1961 (1961); Kelley, Security
Transfers Eased Under the Uniform Commercial Code in Massachusetts, 98 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 94 (1959); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review, Assess-
ment, Prospect-November, 1959, 16 Bus. LAW. 348 (1960) ; Malcolm and Funk,
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Experience Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17
Bus. LAW. 525 (1961); Schnader, The Unsecured Creditor-"The Little Businessman"
-and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 B.C. IND. & COM. L.R. 65 (1959) ; Schnader,
Uniform Commercial Law-How Soon?, 13 PERS. FIN. Q. 68 (1959).
6. U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(f) expressly permitting consultation of the Comments in the
construction and application of the Act has been deleted in the current draft. See Del
Duca, Title Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and Pre-Act Contracts Under
Pennsylvania's Sales and Use Tax, 63 DICK. L. REV. 253, 258 (1959).
7. For example, see BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE (1958) ; CLARK, BAILEY AND
YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS (1959); HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER
(1959) ; HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (1958) ; SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
(1959).
8. 1954-1956 NEW YORK REPORTS OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION.
9. Of particular interest is the N.J. study prepared by Professor Hawkland in
1960, NEW JERSEY, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1960). See also the
New York studies, supra note 8; PENNSYLVANIA, ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1952) and MASSACHUSETTS, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMISSION
TO STUDY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1954).
10. Where more than one issue involving the U.C.C. was raised in a case, it was
classified on the basis of the author's judgment as to its primary relevance.
11. U.C.C. § 1-105(1). See Burton, The Uniform Commercial Code and Conflicts
of Laws, 9 AM. J. CoMp. L. 458, 463 (1960) ; Yntema, Autonomy in Choice of Law, 1
Am. J. COMP. L. 341 (1952) ; Yntema, Contract and Conflict of Laws: Autonomy in
Choice of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46 (1955).
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cation of the specialized conflicts rules contained in the code.12 If the parties
have not selected the applicable law and use of the mandatory conflicts rules
is not required, the Code applies "to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation" (emphasis added) to the forum code state.'
3
These conflicts of law provisions have been cited as binding authority
in five litigated cases, all of which pertained to secured transactions involv-
ing the Code's mandatory conflicts of law provisions. 14 To facilitate clarity
of presentation, detailed discussion of all but one of these cases will be de-
ferred to a forthcoming installment of this article dealing with secured
transactions.
In Peoples Bank v. Nieman,15 the plaintiff, a South Carolina bank,
sought to recover by writ of replevin in Pennsylvania an automobile in which
it held a chattel mortgage, executed in South Carolina on June 16, 1954, and
duly recorded pursuant to the law of that state. While the indebtedness was
still outstanding, the debtor, in violation of the chattel mortgage agreement,
brought the automobile into Pennsylvania on or about July 15, 1954. On
August 6, 1954, the defendants purchased and acquired possession of the
vehicle from a used car exchange and on August 13, 1954, they were issued
a Certificate of Title by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.' 6
Plaintiff Bank's theory of recovery was based on the "conflicts" rule
set forth in Section 9-103 (3) of the Code which provides that if the security
interest in personal property
was already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the
property was when the security interest attached and before being
brought into this state, the security interest continues perfected in
this state for four months and also thereafter if within the four
month period it is perfected in this state.
The bank argued that since all of the requirements of this provision
were satisfied, its security interest should be paramount. The court dis-
agreed and held that the Code was not applicable to the transaction. The
decision was based on Section 1-105 (5) of the 1952 Code which provided
that the Secured Transactions Article applied whenever "any contract or
transaction" within its "terms is made or occurs after the effective date of
12. U.C.C. §§ 2-402, 4-102, 6-102, 8-106, 9-102 & 9-103.
13. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) and Comments thereto.
14. Atlas Credit Corporation v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 49, 165 A.2d 704 (1960)
Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 7 Luz. Leg. Reg. 42 (Pa. 1960)
Safeway Finance Company v. Michael Heintzl, 43 Erie Co. L.J. 132 (Pa. 1959)
Industrial Packaging Products Company v. Fort Pitt Packaging International, Inc.,
399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960) ; People's Bank v. Nieman, 10 D.&C.2d 125 (Pa. 1956).
15. People's Bank v. Nieman, supra note 14.
16. The South Carolina creditor had attempted to "perfect" his security interest in
Pennsylvania by filing in the county involved, but such filing was ineffective. Perfection
of a security interest in an automobile in Pennsylvania must be pursuant to PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302(3) (b).
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this act . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The court reasoned that since the chattel
mortgage was executed on June 16, 1954, prior to the Code's effective date
in Pennsylvania,17 the pre-code Pennsylvania law must govern the rights of
the parties and that the defendant would prevail if he could establish that he
was a good faith purchaser for value without notice of the security interest.
The court was correct in ruling that the security agreement, since it
was executed prior to the effective date, was not itself subject to the Code.
But what of the entry of the collateral into Pennsylvania, its subsequent
sale to the used car dealer and its re-sale to defendants, all of which occurred
after the effective date of the Code? It might be argued that the occurrence
of any one of these events was sufficient to make the Code applicable be-
cause such events fall within the language "any contract or transaction oc-
curring after the effective date" (emphasis added) of the Code.1
8
This type of transitional fact situation is one which states enacting the
Code will experience with some frequency during its initial period of appli-
cation. Problems raised by such transitional cases were foreseen both by
the Code draftsman and the New York Law Revision Commission. The
revised draft, which deleted former Section 1-105 (5), now provides in
Section 10-102 that:
Transactions validly entered into before the effective date of
the code and the rights, duties, and interests flowing front them
remain valid thereafter and may be terminated, completed, consure-
mated, or enforced as required or permitted by any statute or other
law amended or repealed by the code as though such repeal or
amendment had not occurred. (Emphasis added.) 19
This language clarifies and broadens the earlier draft and is in accord
with the result reached in the Nieman Case. It adds certainty to an area
which might otherwise be the source of considerable controversy in the ab-
sence of such a provision.
17. Supra note 2.
18. U.C.C. § 1-105 was rewritten in its entirety in the revised draft. The
language in question was also used in the earlier draft in designating the applicability
of all articles of the Code. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-105 (1952).
19. U.C.C. § 10-101 was changed in the current edition to provide that "[the Code]
applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date." (Emphasis
added.) It should also be noted that Pennsylvania has expressly dealt with the problem
of the duration of protection granted to security interests which were recorded prior to
the effective date of the Code. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 505.1-19. See also 1 PA.






SHORT TITLE, GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND SUBJECT MATTER
Definition of Sale: Passing of Title
The question in several cases has been whether the definition of "sale"
20
and the "passage of title" 21 rules of the Uniform Commercial Code are ap-
plicable to "public law" controversies such as zoning, venue, and sales, use,
and gross receipts tax liability. The Comments of Section 2-401 expressly
state that the Code is neutral on the issue, and leave to the judiciary the task
of determining whether particular public laws require application of these
provisions.
22
In Sears Roebuck v. Powers, 2 a Philadelphia zoning ordinance provided
that in specified districts the "sale and storage of goods, merchandise, and
commodities in stores or showrooms for sale on the premises at retail"
24
(emphasis added) was permissible. The property, operated by Sears and
located within such a district, was not equipped to serve customers, was not
staffed with any sales personnel, contained no merchandise displays, most of
the merchandise therein was stored in cartons, and the building was desig-
nated by Sears as "Sears Roebuck Company Warehouse." However, in a
few instances, merchandise which was on display and ordered at a Sears
retail outlet elsewhere in the city, was physically delivered to customers at
this site. The supreme court concluded that under the Code, in these cases,
title passed and the sale was therefore technically consummated on the
premises. It held, however, that the property was essentially used for ware-
housing and not retail selling, and thus prohibited under the ordinance. It
noted that :
The 'passage of title' concepts in the Uniform Commercial
Code are not helpful in solving the zoning problem presented in this
case. The rules of the Code relied upon are designed to determine,
at the various stages in a commercial transaction, the relative rights
and liabilities of buyers and sellers. While the subtleties of the sales
definition of the code are important to the law of commercial con-
tracts, they have no application to the zoning regulations involved
in the present case which concerns the physical use to which land
is put.
20. U.C.C. § 2-106 defines "sale" as "the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price (Section 2-401)."
21. U.C.C. § 2-401.
22. COMMENT 1, U.C.C. § 2-401. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see
Del Duca, supra note 6.
23. 390 Pa. 260, 134 A.2d 659 (1957).
24. Id. at 207, 134 A.2d at 660.
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In determining whether a building is a warehouse or a store
for retail sale on the premises, the critical question is: Does it
possess the characteristics embodied in the zoning law concept of a
warehouse or of a retail store? The record is plain that the Pine
Street premises has the characteristics of a warehouse. It is serv-
iced by a regular flow of heavy trucks producing noxious Diesel
fumes and causing a serious traffic problem. Further, there is a con-
tinual loading and unloading of freight which results in annoying
noise as does the handling of the merchandise necessary to the oper-
ation of the Sears premises.
25
One may wonder if, in the Sears case, a substantial number of trans-
actions in the building had consisted of "pick-up" orders, whether the court
would have ruled that it was being used as a retail sales outlet. It would
appear not, since the language of the court rejected the "title-passing tech-
nicalities" and, instead, considered relevant the type of operation and its
effect upon the people and surrounding neighborhood.
The Code definition of "sale" has also been utilized in determining
whether transactions were taxable under a sales and use tax statute and a
gross receipts tax ordinance. National Dairy Products Corp. v. Gleason 2
held that a transfer of motor vehicles by two subsidiaries to a parent cor-
poration as part of their merger into the parent corporation did not consti-
tute a sale under the Code or a "sale at retail" under the sales and use tax
statute,27 and was therefore not a taxable transaction. The parent corpora-
tion brought an action to enjoin the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from
collecting a sales tax on the transfer. The Commonwealth contended that the
transfer of the vehicles constituted a taxable "sale at retail" which was de-
fined by the tax statute as "a transfer for a consideration of the ownership,
custody or possession of tangible personal property, including a license to
use, . ..by whatsoever means the same shall have been effected." '28 Recog-
nizing that the "private law" concepts of sale are included within this broad
statutory provision the court examined the dictionary, case law, Uniform
Sales Act, and Uniform Commercial Code definitions of sale and concluded
that in order for there to be a sale, consideration must pass from a buyer
to a seller in exchange for the title to goods. Thus, it ruled that since the
subsidiaries transferring the vehicles ceased to exist upon their merger, no
consideration could pass to a seller because there was no "seller" in existence
after the merger. The transfer under the merger agreement was held to be
by operation of law and not by the volition of a seller, and for this reason,
the transaction was not a private law "sale" or a "sale at retail."
More recently, the same court which decided the National Dairy case
25. Id. at 211, 134 A.2d at 662.
26. 72 Dauph. 112, 16 D.&C.2d 390 (Pa. 1958).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-1 (1956).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(j) (1) (1956).
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handed down a related decision which limits its holding to transfers of prop-
erty as part of a corporate merger. In Commonwealth v. Sylvan Seal Milk,
Inc., 29 a transfer of vehicles from a subsidiary to a parent corporation was
held to be a "sale" under the Code and a "sale at retail" under the tax
statute and, therefore, subject to tax. In so ruling, the court distinguished
the prior case by noting that here the transfer did not occur as part of
a merger. The subsidiary's continued existence after the transfer coupled
with the exchange of consideration between the parties made the transaction
taxable.
In Arrowhead Sportswear Corp. v. Philadelphia School District,80 a
taxpayer contended that it was entitled to an exemption from a Philadelphia
gross receipts tax under a provision of the applicable ordinance which pro-
vided that "receipts shall exclude . . .the portion thereof attributable to any
sale involving the bona fide delivery of goods, commodities, wares, or mer-
chandise of the taxpayer's own manufacture." 3' (Emphasis added.) The
taxpayer, who cut and sewed jakets for a single customer, supplied the trim-
mings and thread which constituted approximately one-seventh of the total
materials cost. The customer supplied all of the cloth used. In denying
the exemption, the court ruled that title to the jackets did not pass from
taxpayer to its customer, and therefore, no sale occurred. In so ruling it
stated :
When the owner of raw materials delivers such raw materials to
another who is to use them in manufacturing a finished product,
and other property or materials (the trimmings, bindings, and
thread) are added by the manufacturer, the proportion which they
bear to the original property or materials governs in determining
the title to the finished article.
32
After holding that the taxpayer was essentially rendering a service and
not making sales, the court, nevertheless, permitted it to deduct from the
receipts received from its customer, the portion thereof attributable to trim-
mings and thread furnished by it. In so doing, the court, noting a similarity
between a sale and the incorporation of the taxpayer's materials into the
finished product, commented that "The trimmings and thread were property
which belonged to appellant and a portion of the price paid to appellant for
manufacturing the jackets was consideration for the transfer of ownership
to [the customer] .33
29. - Dauph. -, 3 C.C.H. State Tax Rep. 200-163 (Pa. 1961). Actually there
was found to exist constructive consideration here, and this was sufficient to sustain
the contract. Id. at 21, 423.
30. 22 D.&C.2d 134 (Pa. 1960).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 584.1(d) (1949).
32. Supra note 30 at 137, 138.
33. Supra note 30 at 139. In citing a regulation which provided that "the word
'sale' includes, but is not limited to the transfer of title for a consideration," the taxpayer
1961]
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In Welding Engineers Inc. v. Aetna-Standard Engineering34 plaintiff, a
Delaware Corporation, sued an Ohio Corporation for patent infringement in
the Western District of Pennsylvania. Defendant moved for dismissal of
the action for lack of venue. The parties agreed that the sale without au-
thority of a patented commodity during the term of the patent constituted
patent infringement.35 They also agreed that civil actions for patent in-
fringement could be brought in a judicial district where the defendant com-
mitted acts of infringement and had a regular established place of business.
3 6
The controversy turned on whether defendant had sold two pieces of equip-
ment in violation of the patent law in the Western District of Pennsylvania
thereby making venue in that district proper. The equipment was purchased
by a Michigan buyer from defendant pursuant to a contract of sale which
was negotiated and accepted in Ohio. Defendant also manufactured the
equipment in Ohio and pursuant to the contract "f.o.b. Ohio" provision made
delivery to an Ohio carrier. Defendant's Pennsylvania officers controlled
production policies, had the power to veto all sales, and, in this particular
transaction, approved the grant of credit terms. The court ruled that venue
did not lie in the Western District of Pennsylvania despite these latter asso-
ciations, since title had passed and the sale was consummated when the ma-
chines were delivered to the Ohio carrier for shipment to Michigan. Thus,
no act of infringement had occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
In so ruling the court noted that a "sale" consists in the passage of title to
goods from a seller to a buyer and that under the Code, absent an explicit
agreement, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods. 37 In overruling plaintiff's contention that the commercial definition
of sale is not applicable to venue questions in a patent infringement case,
the court stated, "we have found no authority for the proposition that the
term 'sells' as used in the [Patent Statute] means anything other than what
is ordinarily contemplated by the term sale."
38
The Code definition of "sale" and its "passage of title" rules were also
considered in Victor v. Barzaleski39 where the applicability of the warranty
sections of Article 2 turned on the question of whether the transaction was a
also argued that a "sale" under the ordinance in question did not require a transfer of
title for a consideration. The court did not agree with this argument and ruled that
the phrase "but is not limited to transfer of title for a consideration" was intended to
cover situations where, although all other vestige of ownership had been transferred to
the buyer, title was retained by the seller as a security interest.
34. 169 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1952).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1948).
37. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (a). See also U.C.C. § 2-319.
38. Supra note 34 at 149.
39. 49 Luz. Leg. Reg. 155, 19 D.&C.2d 698 (Pa. 1959).
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"sale." In this case a general handyman orally agreed to purchase and install
a furnace unit in plaintiff's apartment house. While plaintiffs had informed
defendant that they were relying on his skill and judgment to supply a unit
which would furnish sufficient heat for the building, it was understood that
no guarantee was given. After installation, it was discovered that the unit
had an insufficient heat output, and plaintiffs had to replace it. Plaintiffs
sued on the theory of breach of the warranties of merchantability and fitness
for purpose. In sustaining a motion by defendant for judgment n.o.v., the
court held that the warranty provisions of the code were not applicable since
the transaction between the buyer and seller was not a sale. The court ruled
that the defendant was an "intermediary" as to the purchase of the furnace
and seemingly concluded that an agency relationship rather than one of
vendor-vendee existed between the parties for the purchase of the stove.
It treated the agreement for its installation as a service contract. The court
noted that the defendant was a general handyman who had worked previously
for the plaintiffs as a plasterer rather than a plumber, and that defendant,
on the few occasions when he did install heating systems, merely purchased
the units for others and then did the installation work himself.
Although the Sears Roebuck, National Dairy, Sylvan Seal, Arrowhead,
and Welding Engineers cases reached different results on the question of
whether the Code definition of "sale" and the provisions pertaining to
"passage of title" should be applicable in resolving "public" law issues, these
decisions are not necessarily irreconcilable. In a zoning case involving the
issue of whether a building is used for sales or warehousing purposes, the
court reasonably concluded that the legislature was interested in the prac-
tical effect of the activity on the neighborhood involved and did not intend
the technical commercial definition of "sale" to be applicable. On the other
hand in a patent infringement case involving questions of venue which basic-
ally raise an issue of convenience of the forum to the defendant, a court may
very well decide that this issue should be governed by the private law defi-
nition of "sale" which determines the place where the parties consummated
the sale. Similarly, a statutory definition of "sale at retail" such as was
involved in the National Dairy and Sylvan Seal cases which encompasses
"any transfer of ownership, possession or custody, including a license to
use . . . by whatsoever means effected" is obviously broad enough to include
a transfer which qualifies as a "sale" under the Code.
It might be argued that to permit the courts to determine the applicability
of these Code provisions to "public law" controversies leads to confusion and
the lack of predictability. However, the variety of policies and fact situa-
tions which are likely to arise in the vast arena of public law indicate the




In the Edwin J. Schoettle Co. Appeal,40 the supreme court ruled that a
contract for the purchase of stocks was not governed by the Sales Article of
the Code because "investment securities" are expressly excluded from the
definition of goods contained in Section 2-105. It quoted the Comments41
thereto which expressly state that this exclusion was not intended "to pre-
vent the application of a particular section of this Article by analogy to se-
curities . . .when the reason of that section makes such application sensible
and the situation involved is not covered by the Article of this Act dealing
specifically with said securities (Art. 8) ."42 Nevertheless, it chose not to
apply the Sales Article.
In this case buyer had entered into a 25 page agreement for the pur-
chase of the stock of a corporation and five of its subsidiaries. The agree-
ment contained a section entitled "Conditions precedent" which provided
that the financial condition of the corporations at the time of closing (Sep-
tember 1954) would be no less favorable than shown on their statements
of June 30, 1954. No comparable provision was contained in the section
of the agreement entitled "Representations and warranties." The supreme
court sustained a finding that the language of the lengthy detailed agreement
was clear and unambigious on this point. Evidence of pre-contract negotia-
tions which allegedly established that the sellers also warranted the financial
condition of the corporation was therefore excluded by the common law
parol evidence rule. The court then concluded that since the condition was
not also a warranty, buyer was limited to rescinding the contract and, there-
fore, could not both accept performance and sue for the breach.
PART 2
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT
Formal Requirements: Statute of Frauds
Under the statute of frauds requirement there have been cases inter-
preting the provisions of the Code that a contract for the sale of goods for
a price of 500 dollars or more must be in writing to be enforceable4 3 and that,
between merchants, a written confirmation of such an oral contract is binding
unless objected to within 10 days of receipt. 44 Also litigated were cases in-
volving the enforceability of such oral contracts 45 where (a) the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits the contract was entered into in his
40. 390 Pa. 365, 134 A.2d 908 (1957).
41. U.C.C. § 2-105, Comment 1.
42. Supra note 40 at 374, 134 A.2d at 913.
43. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
44. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
45. U.C.C. § 2-201(3).
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pleading, testimony or otherwise in court, 46 or (b) there has been partial
performance.
47
In Fyre-Safety Inc. v. Yerger Bros. Inc.48 the parties had entered into an
oral contract for the sale and installation of a fire alarm system at a price of 2,200
dollars. After an initial payment of 500 dollars was made at the execution of
the contract, the buyer refused to further perform even though the seller had
completed the installation of the alarm system. The buyer, acting through its
president, had signed a writing evidencing the oral contract, but the seller
who sought enforcement had not signed. In citing Section 2-201 (1) which
provides that the contract is enforceable if the writing is "signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker,"
the court held that since the writing was signed by the buyer's president the
contract was enforceable. The court further noted that seller could also en-
force the contract because the fire alarm system had been delivered and in-
stalled and, therefore, the part performance requirement of the statute of
frauds was complied with.
49
In Treska v. DeGennaro0 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant
from disposing of or otherwise encumbering certain heavy equipment on the
theory that the defendant had conveyed to the plaintiff a partnership interest
therein. The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden
of proving the formation of a partnership and ruled that the relationship
between the parties was one of bailor and bailee. It also noted that in the
absence of a writing which complied with the Code's statute of frauds pro-
visions a partnership agreement involving a sale of an interest in goods
for the price of 500 dollars or more would not be enforceable.
In Harry Rubin & Son, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co. of America, Inc.51
the supreme court interpreted Section 2-201 (2) of the Code which provides
that between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, the recipient is bound by the
terms of such writing unless written notice of objection to its contents is
given within ten days after its receipt. In this case the seller, a merchant,
received from the buyer a written confirmation referring to a prior oral
agreement as an "order" rather than a "contract" or "agreement." The
court held that since the seller did not give the required notice of objection,
he was bound according to the terms of the written confirmation. In so
46. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
47. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
48. 56 Lanc. Rev. 311 (Pa. 1958).
49. U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c) (1952). Further discussion of other litigation involving
the "part performance" provisions of the U.C.C. is contained in the text infra.
50. 38 Wash. Co. R. 50 (Pa. 1959).
51. 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
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holding, the court noted that in order to satisfy the statute of frauds writing
requirement, the "writing must afford a basis for believing that the offered
oral evidence rests on a real transaction" 52-the object being "the elimina-
tion of certain formalistic requirements adherence to which often resulted in
injustice rather than the prevention of fraud. '5 3 The seller recipient argued
that the use of the word "order" rather than "contract" or "agreement" in
the memorandum as a matter of law established that it could not be "in
confirmation of the contract" as required by Section 2-201(2). The court
ruled, as a matter of law, that "The word 'order' as employed in this
letter obviously contemplated a binding agreement at least on the part
of the sender, and in all reason should have been interpreted in that manner
by the recipient. '54 There were also other instances in the "course of deal-
ing" 55 between the parties in which the word "order" had been used synony-
mously with the word "contract."
The Code requirement of a "written response within ten days to a con-
firmatory memorandum of a prior oral agreement" is both new and sound.
It should be noted that this provision applies only to transactions "between
merchants."' 6 By binding both the sender of the signed confirmatory writing
and the recipient who fails to make timely objection thereto it furthers the
52. Id. at 512, 153 A.2d at 476. Certain comparisons between the U.C.C. and the
SALES ACT statute of frauds "writing" requirement should be noted, though they have
yet to be litigated. Unlike the writing requirements of the UNIFORM SALES ACT, the
U.C.C. statute of frauds provides that a writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon. However, the U.C.C. makes such a contract
enforceable only to the extent of the quantity of goods shown in such writing. The
U.CC. does not require a written memorandum of the contract itself, but merely requires
that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral testimony rests on a
real transaction. The price, time and place of delivery or payment, the general quality
of goods or any particular warranties may all be omitted, A writing which affords a
basis for believing that the offered oral testimony rests on a real transaction and specifies
the quantity of goods to be purchased and which is acknowledged in some manner by
the person to be charged therefore, meets the writing requirement of the U.C.C. sale of
goods statute of frauds. The U.C.C. has elsewhere shown liberality in easing the
requirements of definiteness of terms for creation of a contract. It requires application
of reasonable standards in ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the missing
terms rather than invalidation of the agreement for lack of definiteness. Many agreements,
which would have been invalid previously because of indefiniteness, under the U.C.C. will
now be binding contracts. Section 2-204(3) of the U.C.C., dealing generally with the
question of "open terms," § 2-305, relating to "open price" contracts, § 2-306, relating
to output requirements for exclusive dealings contracts, and § 2-311, relating to con-
tracts leaving the particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties, are
all examples of the U.C.C.'s policy of adopting commercial standards for filling vacuums
in agreements which under the common law contract law would have been invalid for
lack of definiteness.
53. Id. at 512, 153 A.2d at 476.
54. Id. at 511, 153 A.2d at 475.
55. Although the court did not cite the definition of "course of dealing" found in
U.C.C. § 1-205, it nevertheless used this concept in deciding the case.
56. The U.C.C. defines "merchant" in § 2-104(1) and holds a "merchant" to a higher
standard of conduct than the "non-merchant." See, for example, U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b)
and Comment 2 thereto.
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common law policy of requiring "mutuality of obligation" as a prerequisite
of contract liability. Under Section 2-201(1) of the Code and analagous
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act,57 only the sender of the signed writing
is bound by the oral agreement. The lack of mutuality of obligation in this
situation has been rationalized on the grounds that the purpose of the stat-
ute of frauds writing requirement is primarily to help compel the produc-
tion of written evidence of the terms of the contract against the party sought
to be charged, and that it pre-supposes that the requirements of mutuality
of obligation between the parties, ordinarily necessary to the creation of a
contract, are otherwise complied with.5 8 There is merit in this explanation.
However, the fact remains that if only the sender is bound by the writing,
enforcement remedies are unilaterally held by the recipient who, according
to his personal whim and market conditions may choose to be bound or
not be bound.
The Code reasonably balances the rights of all parties in this situation.
It places no duty on the "non-merchant" buyer or seller to respond to "con-
firmatory" writings. It merely requires merchants, 9 presumably knowledge-
able in the practices of the commercial world, to make timely objection to
confirmatory writings they receive or else, like the sender, be bound to the
terms contained therein.
Litigation has occurred involving the Code provision that an admission
by a party to an oral contract in his petition, testimony, or otherwise in court
that an agreement was duly consummated makes such contract enforceable
against him. 60 Beter v. Helman6 ' held that a demurrer to a petition to enjoin
defendants from selling or transferring a business which they had allegedly
agreed, by parol, to sell to plaintiff was not an absolute admission of fact in
a pleading and the alleged oral agreement was therefore unenforceable. In
so holding, the court observed that "a demurrer is not an absolute admission
of any fact, but simply admits those facts that are well pleaded for the sole
purpose of handling their legal sufficiency as determined by the court."
6 2
In Williamson v. Martz63 the court, applying the acceptance of pay-
ment portion of Section 2-201(3) (c), held that where a buyer had paid 100
dollars of a total purchase price of 1600 dollars, the seller could not enforce an
57. U.S.A. § 4.
58. See Hawkland, supra note 9 at 33.
59. Literally interpreted, Section 2-201(2) apparently would not apply to the
situation where a "merchant" fails to make timely response to a signed confirmatory
writing sent by a "non-merchant." Query whether the standard of reasonable com-
mercial conduct underlying this provision does not require the "merchant-recipient"
to acknowledge confirmatory writings, irrespective of whether the sender be a "merchant"
or a "non-merchant"?
60. Supra note 46.
61. 41 West. 7 (Pa. 1958).
62. Id. at 12.
63. 29 Northumb. L.J. 32, 11 D.&C.2d 33 (Pa. 1958).
1961]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
oral agreement for the sale of two identical vats. The court reasoned that the
fCode makes an oral contract enforceable only to the extent that payment has
'been made and the 100 dollars paid did not cover the price of a commercial
-unit involved in the transaction. It noted that, under the Uniform Sales
Act, "part payment took the whole contract outside of the statute of frauds ...
because the Sales Act did not discriminate [for statute of frauds purposes]
between divisible and indivisable contracts, or between those providing for
bulk or installment deliveries, nor did it make any distinction regarding the
character of the contract. ' 64 Furthermore, "Under the Code, part payment
-takes the case out of the statute only to the extent for which payment had
-been made," therefore making "an important change by denying the enforce-
:ment of the contract where in the case of a single object the payment made
is less than the full amount."65
In Kerecman v. Diedrich66 plaintiff entered into a written contract for
the sale of a store and fixtures to the defendant. The parties on the same
day allegedly entered into an additional oral agreement for the sale of the
stock in the building at the wholesale price which, after an inventory of the
goods had been taken, was determined to be over 500 dollars. Defendants took
possession of the store building and the inventory, actually selling some of
the stock. The court held that the taking of possession of the inventory and
the receipt of proceeds from its resale constituted "receipt and acceptance of
goods," thus making the oral contract enforceable under Section 2-201 (3) (c).
Under the Uniform Sales Act, receipt and acceptance of part payment
by a seller, or a portion of the goods by a buyer, served as a basis for
permitting the parties to sue for performance of the entire oral agreement.
Under this provision, a dishonest seller or buyer might successfully persuade
a court or jury that a small initial payment, or receipt of goods, was part
performance of an oral contract for a purchase price or quantity of goods
greatly exceeding the amount actually agreed upon by the parties. Under
the Code, since payment and acceptance thereof, or receipt and acceptance
of goods, makes the contract enforceable by either party only to the extent
that performance has occurred, such fraudulent claims are not possible.
However, as illustrated by the Williams case, where the part payment is not
sufficient to cover the price of a commercial unit the contract is completely
unenforceable.67
64. Id. at 34, 11 D.&C.2d 35.
65. Id. at 35, 11 D.&C.2d at 35.
66. 1 Craw. 204 (Pa. 1961).
67. Note that this provision is comparable with U.C.C. § 2-201(1), which states
that all that is needed to enforce a contract is "some writing sufficient to indicate that a
-contract for sale had been made." However, this writing is unenforceable beyond the
"quantity of goods shown in such writing." Note also U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (b), where
:an admission "that a contract for sale has been made" makes a contract enforceable,
but only to the extent of the "quantity of goods admitted."
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Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence
In an action for purchase price the buyer in Holland Furnace Co. v.
Heidrich6 8 counterclaimed for return of his down payment. The contract,
for the purchase of a furnace, was entered into on one of seller's printed
"Cleaning and Repair Service" contract forms. Printed in pencil thereon,
following a provision entitled "Additional Material and Labor as Follows,"
was the phrase "one cozy-aire oil furnace installed . . . $350." 69 The court
ruled that the patent ambiguities on the face of the instrument established
that the writing was obviously not "intended . . . as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms agreed upon."'70 Therefore, in accord with the "parol
evidence" rule of Section 2-202 of the Code, defendant buyer was permitted
to introduce evidence of a parol contemporaneous agreement in support of
his breach of warranty theory.
PART 3
GENERAL OBLIGATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT
Open Price Term
In Elray Tool & Die Corp. v. Knox 71 the court denied defendant-
buyer's motion for a more specific complaint where the price of goods sold
was not set forth in seller's complaint. In so ruling, the court cited Sec-
tion 2-30572 of the Code which expressly states that:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is
a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; ....
Warranties
The warranty provisions litigated concern: title; merchantability; fit-
ness for purpose; impurities, which are a natural part of a food product
68. 7 D.&C.2d 204 (Pa. 1955).
69. Id. at 205.
70. Id. at 207.
71. 68 Dauph. 7 (Pa. 1955).
72. U.C.C. § 2-305, Open Price Term, is a specific application of general principals
regarding requirements of definiteness of contract terms found in § 2-204(3). In Penna.
Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., - Del. -, 166 A.2d 726 (1961), a memorandum for
the sale of stock stated that the "offer" and "understanding" was subject to "formal
approval" of its board of directors, but contained specific quantity and price terms.
It also provided that if the terms were satisfactory, "acceptance" was to be noted on an
attached carbon, which defendants did. Defendants subsequently sold the stock at a
higher price claiming that no binding agreement existed. In an action for specific
performance or alternatively damages for the breach, the Delaware court, applying
Pennsylvania law, denied motions for summary judgment made by both parties ruling
that a jury should determine whether the parties intended to be bound. Quoting Section
2-204(3) and Comments thereto, it also held that if the parties intended to be bound
the fact that one or more terms were left open would not invalidate the contract for
indefiniteness if a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy existed.
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which causes injuries; circumstances under which a warranty by sample also
gives rise to a warranty of fitness; admissibility of parol evidence to estab-
lish implied warranties; sufficiency of disclaimer clauses to avoid liability for
breach of warranties; and privity of contract as a prerequisite for recovery
on a breach of warranty theory.
Frank v. McCafferty Ford Co. and Broad Motor Co.73 held that where
a warrantor of title is notified to defend an action of replevin brought against
his vendee and fails to do so, it is bound by the judgment rendered against
the vendee and is estopped thereafter from denying the defect in its title.
In the breach of warranty of title action brought by the vendee against his
vendor, the court permitted an exemplified copy of the proceedings in the
uncontested replevin action to be admitted. Section 2-312 of the Code was
cited to establish that the used car dealer gave a warranty of good title to the
vendee. Only cases involving sales of realty were cited as authority for
barring the warrantor from defending his title after his failure to appear
in the replevin action.7 4 The court stated however that "we can see no
reason to apply a different rule to warrantors of stolen personal property
than to warrantors of real estate."
75
In Degraff v. Myers Foods, Inc.76 plaintiff alleged that he had purchased
certain chicken pie which had been prepared, packed and distributed by
defendant, and that on eating it, a chicken bone lodged in this throat, resulting
in the injuries for which damages were claimed. Defendant demurred, con-
tending that no breach of warranty had occurred since the alleged chicken bone
was a natural part of chicken pie and not a foreign substance. The court
cited cases from other jurisdictions holding as a matter of law that no breach
of warranty exists where the impurity is a natural part of the food product
77
However, it chose to follow Pennsylvania cases holding that it is a jury ques-
tion whether such products are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such foods are used." s78 The court further noted that if the jury found that
a breach of warranty had occurred, an award of consequential damages for
the personal injuries incurred would have to be limited to those injuries
which "proximately" resulted from the breach.7
73. 192 Pa. Super. 435, 161 A.2d 896 (1960).
74. The court cited as authority Ives v. Niles, 5 Watts 323 (1836), Aryres v.
Findley, 1 Pa. 501 (1845) and Hanley v. Ryan, 87 Pa. Super. 6 (1926). Id. at 439, 161
A.2d at 898, 899.
75. Supra note 73 at 439, 161 A.2d at 898.
76. 8 Bucks 364, 19 D.&C.2d 192 (1958).
77. Id. at 366, 367, 19 D.&C.2d at 21, 22.
78. Id. at 367, 19 D.&C.2d at 23.
79 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-714(2) provides:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
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Loomis Bros. Corp. v. Queen8 ° held that where a sale is by sample and
seller, at the time of contracting, has reason to know the particular purpose
for which the goods are required and buyer relies on seller's skill and judg-
ment, both a warranty of sample and of fitness for a specific purpose arise.
In this case defendant buyer conceded that the storm and screen windows
which he had purchased conformed to the samples upon which the sale was
based. However, he contended that a warranty of fitness for a specific
purpose was breached because the windows did not fit snug and tight and
did not keep out rain, snow, and wind. The court granted his petition to
open the judgment which had been confessed by the plaintiff seller. In so
doing, it ruled that a jury should determine whether a breach of warranty of
fitness had actually occurred since the seller may not have had reason to
know that the screen and storm windows were to be used in a newly built
home in a rural section, unprotected by other dwellings and exposed to the
full velocity of wind and weather. While concluding that in this case both
a warranty by sample and fitness may have been given, the court also
recognized that a warranty by sample can be given independently of a
warranty of merchantability or fitness for purpose."'
In Levitz Furniture Co. v. Fields 2 the defendant purchased a television
set from the plaintiff and, on a petition to open a confessed judgment, alleged
that the knobs used in the operation of the set fell off, that it was im-
possible to change and select channels, and that the picture faded out on
numerous occasions notwithstanding the efforts of plaintiff's employees to
adjust the set. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs83 similarly arose procedurally on peti-
tion by defendant to open a confessed judgment, but involved an agreement
for the sale of storm windows by plaintiff to defendant. Defendant alleged
that the storm windows in question did not prevent leakage of air into the
house. In both cases the court granted the petition to open judgment and
held that an implied warranty of fitness for purpose arose because the
consumer-buyer relied on the judgment of the seller and the seller knew the
purpose for which the property was to be used. The court also held that
pre-contract oral statements tending to establish the implied warranties
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount.
Also § 2-715(2)(b) provides:
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . . (b) injury
to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
80. 46 Del. 76, 17 D.&C.2d 482 (Pa. 1958).
81. For example, (a) no warranty of merchantability will arise even though the
goods are sold by sample where the seller is a non-merchant with respect to the goods
sold and (b) no warranty of fitness will arise where at the time of contracting, seller
does not know or have reason to know the particular purpose for which the goods are
being purchased or buyer does not rely on seller's skill in choosing the goods.
82. 6 Leb. 385 (Pa. 1958).
83. 6 Leb. 344 (Pa. 1958).
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were not excluded under the parol evidence rule because of disclaimer clauses
in the contract. In so ruling the court stated that "the implied warranty
arises independently and outside of the contract and is imposed by operation
of law."
84
Courts have ruled on the effect of language disclaiming seller's war-
ranty liabilities. In L. & N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc.8 5 the de-
fendant petitioned the court to open a judgment which plaintiff had con-
fessed against him. Defendant, a proprietor of a tap room, had purchased
devices from the plaintiff known as "bev flo pourers" which are placed on
whiskey bottles for the purpose of automatically measuring whiskey drinks.
The pourers did not operate properly and dispensed drinks which varied
substantially in size, some being too small and some being too large. Timely
notice of the defect was given, but plaintiff was unable to correct the situation
and refused to take back the pourers. Defendant then refused to make pay-
ment after which judgment was entered. Plaintiff contended that all war-
ranties, including those of merchantability and of fitness for purpose, were
disclaimed by the general language "without warranty, guarantee or repre-
sentation of any kind or nature," and "without any express or implied war-
ranties unless written herein. . . ." In granting the petition to open judg-
ment, the court, quoting Section 2-316(2) and the comments thereto which
require that specific disclaimer language be used, held that the plaintiff's
attempt to disclaim these warranties was ineffective.8 6 It observed that this
result was "consistent with the general purpose of the Code to promote fair
dealing in business transactions.
8 7
In L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski88 the buyer experienced the same difficul-
ties with the "bey flo pourers" and defaulted after giving the plaintiff-seller
six weeks within which to adjust the pourers. Plaintiff-seller then confessed
judgment for the unpaid balance plus collection fees. The parties had signed
a contract of sale on September 28, 1955, which did not release or limit the
seller's warranties. On the same day an express warranty of merchantability
was given in a separate writing in lieu of all other warranties express or
implied and all other liabilities or obligations on the seller's part. On
84. Id. at 349; supra note 82 at 392.
85. 12 D.&C.2d 469 (Pa. 1957).
86. The U.C.C. sets down a requirement that disclaimer clauses be specific in that
to disclaim a warranty of merchantability the language must "mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous." In order to disclaim a warranty of
fitness, "the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, § 2-316(2). In Comment 1 to this section the code draftsmen point out their intent
to have buyers of goods take free of "unexpected and unbargained language of dis-
claimer . . . ." Specifically the authors intend to make sales contract provisions in-
operative which generally exclude "all warranties, express or implied." See also U.C.C.
§ 2-316(3).
87. Supra note 85 at 472. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-102.
88. 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
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October 5, 1955, the parties signed a purchase money security agreement in
the form of a conditional sales contract which stated that the purchaser
accepted the pourers in their present condition, after thorough examination,
and without warranty, guarantee or representation of any kind or nature.
The superior court first ruled that the waiver of warranty defenses con-
tained in the conditional sales agreement of October 5, 1955, was not effec-
tive against the seller because Section 9-206(3) expressly 9 prohibited a
purchase money security interest agreement retained by a seller from
eliminating or modifying warranties made in an original contract of sale.
The court further ruled that the express warranty of merchantability given
on September 28, 1955, would not exclude or modify the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose or the implied warranty of merchantability. It
concluded that a warranty of fitness for purpose was not inconsistent with
the express warranty of merchantability given in this case. It noted that
even if it were inconsistent, a warranty of fitness is nevertheless expressly
saved from exclusion by Section 2-317(c) which provides that express
warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties "other than an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." The court also observed that
"the clear and specific language required by Section 2-316(3) . ..was not
used." 90
The Code provisions extending warranty protection to natural persons
in the family or household of the buyer or guests in his home where it is
reasonable to expect that such persons may be injured by the defective
product have also been litigated. The Sales Act lacked such a provision but
warranty protection was often extended to members of the family or house-
hold of the buyer through use of agency or third party beneficiary fictions.9 '
In Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A. Williams Co.9 2 a wholesale dealer who sold a
step ladder to a retail dealer who in turn sold it to plaintiff's employer was
not liable in an action for breach of warranty since, under the Code, a remote
seller may use lack of privity of contract as a defense if local law permits
him to do so. The court noted that Section 2-318 and Comments thereto
89. In the current edition of the U.C.C. this provision was changed to read:
When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the Article
on Sales (article 2) governs the sale and any disclaimer limitation or modifica-
tion of the seller warranties.
The revision was stated to be for "clarity." 1956 RECOMMENDATION OF THE EDITORIAL
BOARD, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 271.
90. This section permits implied warranties to be excluded by expressions like
"'as is,' 'as they stand,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common under-
standing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of the warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty." Section 2-316(2) lists alternative ways of disclaim-
ing implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
91. See Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 225 N.Y. 338, 175 N.E. 105, 74
A.L.R. 339 (1931) (wife as agent of husband in purchase of a loaf of bread).
92. 13 D.&C.2d 14 (Pa. 1957).
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provide that the extension of warranty protection to certain beneficiaries is
"to give the buyer's family, household and guests the benefit of the same
warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby freeing
any such beneficiaries from any technical rules as to 'privity' . . . . Implicit in
the section is that any beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct action
for breach of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to him."
93
(Emphasis added.) In refusing to give beneficiaries within the described
class an action against anyone other than the buyer's immediate seller, the
court quoted Comment 3 to Section 2-318 which states that:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law of whether the seller's warranties, given to
his buyer who resells, extends to other persons in the distributive
chain.
Several Pennsylvania cases were cited which the court considered as binding
for the proposition that a buyer may recover in a breach of warranty action
only against his immediate seller.
94
In Facciolo Paving and Construction Co. Inc. v. Road Machinery, Inc.,95
James V. Facciolo purchased a machine from defendant, obtaining express
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a purpose and an implied war-
ranty of merchantability. He subsequently turned all contract rights in the
machine over to a corporation, Facciolo Paving and Construction Co., Inc.,
which sued the seller for breach of warranties. The court ruled that the
Code's extension of warranty protection granted to the beneficiaries specified
in Section 2-318 was limited to natural persons who are in the family or
household of the buyer or are guests in his home. The corporation was thus
unable to qualify for this protection. Utilizing Section 2-318, Comment 3,96
the court ruled that the Code incorporated local law on this question and
cited Pennsylvania case law which it considered to establish privity of
contract as a prerequisite for recovery in such actions.
9 7
Actually the requirement of privity of contract as a prerequisite for
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318, Comment 2.
94. Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515 (1931), which
permitted recovery in a food case despite the lack of privity, was held inapplicable. The
court followed Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg., 61 F.2d 391 (3rd Cir. 1932)
and Gallagher v. Pittston Tobacco Co., 43 Luz. Leg. Reg. 3 (Pa. 1953). Although
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. is the leading case cited in Pennsylvania for
the proposition that privity of contract is a prerequisite for warranty damages, it should
be noted that this decision actually granted recovery to an ultimate consumer who had
purchased equipment from a middleman, found by the court to be an agent of the
manufacturer. Supra note 92 at 16. See also infra note 98.
95. 8 Chest. Co. Rep. 375 (Pa. 1958).
96. Supra note 93.
97. See Lock v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 65 A.2d 24 (1949). See contra, infra note 98.
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breach of warranty recovery is a question on which the case law of Pennsyl-
vania and many other jurisdictions has undergone rapid change in recent
years. These developments are extremely important and require con-
sultation since the Code is "neutral" (apart from the provisions of Sec-
tions 2-318) and does not uniformly codify, but rather incorporates the law
of the enacting state on this matter. Several jurisdictions have recently
abandoned the privity theory and have permitted the consumers to sue
remote vendors.98
Sale or Return
In Wolcov v. Russell 9 plaintiff sued for the price due on two orders
written on defendant's purchase order blanks. Defendant claimed that
the agreement was a "sale or return," rather than an outright sale,
giving him the right to return the merchandise if unsold. This right allegedly
was contained in a contemporaneous oral agreement. The court ruled that
the written agreement was fully integrated and that the oral evidence was
properly excluded. In so doing, it noted that under Section 2-326 any "or
return" term of a contract of sale is to be treated as a separate contract of
sale within the Code statute of frauds provision and as contradicting the
outright sale aspect of the contract within the parol evidence provision of
Section 2-202.
98. In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959), the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, apparently overruling Kac-markieCwicf, Facciolo and re-
lated cases, allowed recovery for a defect in a truck against the manufacturer because
"privity" is unnecessary to impose liability for warranty damages. McQuaide v. Bridge-
port Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Conn. 1960) applied the "Jarnot" rule in a
diversity of citizenship case when the manufacturer of insecticide was sued for breach
of warranty by a remote buyer. The recent New Jersey decision Henningsen v. Bloom-
field, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), changed the status of the law in that state on
this point. A purchaser of an automobile and his wife were permitted to recover on a war-
ranty theory from the manufacturer who had sold the vehicle to plaintiff's dealer. The
court added that an express disclaimer of liability for personal injuries was not a valid
defense by the manufacturer against the consumer. See Note, 65 DICK. L. REV. 64 (1960).
A purchaser of defective cinder blocks for construction of a cottage was permitted
to recover from the manufacturer of the blocks in Spense v. Three Rivers Builders and
Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 20, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). In Continental Copper Steel
Industry v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius Inc., - Fla. Supp. -, 104 So. 2d 40 (1958), a
Florida court held that a purchaser of cable to be buried in the ground and used for
transmission of electricity could recover from the manufacturer who had not sold directly
to plaintiff. In Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a
California court permitted recovery against a manufacturer on a breach of warranty
theory which was brought on behalf of a passenger killed in an airplane crash. Lack o'
privity was no defense for the manufacturer of the aircraft in this case, even though,
the deceased passenger's contract was one for transportation with the airline which had
purchased the plane from the manufacturer. Rogers v. Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio
244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1961) held a manufacturer liable to a consumer on express warranty
arising from advertising. See annotations, 75 A.L.R.2d 112 (1961) and 75 A.L.R.2d
39 (1961). For a general discussion of the case law, see James, Product Liability,
34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 192 (1955).




TITLE, CREDITORS AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS
Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods; "Entrusting"
Litigation has occurred under the Code concerning the power of an
apparent owner of goods to transfer the rights of the true owner to sub-
sequent purchasers. 100 The courts have also considered questions involving
the rights of purchasers of inventory as against financing agencies holding a
security interest in such stock.1° 1 Since these latter decisions pertain pri-
marily to secured transactions, they will be discussed with the Article 9
cases in a subsequent installment of this article.
In Kovatch v. Hyde10 2 an agent of the vendee, an undisclosed principal,
had purchased an automobile under a contract which provided that passage
of title was conditioned on receipt of payment and transfer of the certificate
of title. Under agency law the agent's knowledge of the title passing con-
ditions in the contract was imputed to the undisclosed principal. As neither
condition was fulfilled, title remained in the vendor although he had trans-
ferred temporary custody of the automobile to the agent. In an action of
replevin to recover the automobile, the court ruled in favor of the vendor
and held that the loss resulting from the agent's absconding with the pur-
chase money should fall upon the principal.
The court pointed out that even though it might be contended that a
vendor-vendee rather than an agency relationship existed between the de-
fendant and his transferor (the alleged agent), this change in characterization
would not improve the defendant's position. Relying on Section 2-403(1),
the court stated that "a purchaser acquires only that title which his transferor
had unless he is a good faith purchaser for value.' 03  Since it concluded
that the defendant lacked "good faith" in this transaction, he therefore
received no better title than the alleged apparent owner. This conclusion
was based on the fact that defendant took delivery without inquiry regarding
100. U.C.C. § 2-403. The rights of the seller's creditors against sold goods
retained by the seller are set forth in U.C.C. § 2-402.
101. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). Weisel v. McBride Motor Sales, 191 Pa. Super. 411, 156
A.2d 613 (1959) ; In re Einhorn Bros. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ; U.G.I.
v. McFalls, 18 D.&C.2d 713 (Pa. 1959) ; First National Bank of Millville v. Horwatt,
122 Pa. Super. 581, 162 A.2d 60 (1960).
102. 47 Luz. Leg. Reg. 13 (Pa. 1956).
103. It should be noted that U.C.C. § 2-403(1) protects a "good faith purchaser
for value" who buys from a person with a voidable title against claims by the "true
owner." U.C.C. § 2-403(2) provides protection for a "buyer in the ordinary course of
business" who purchases from a "merchant who deals in goods of that kind" against
claims of the original owners. The U.C.C. defines "buyer in the ordinary course of
business" in § 1-201(9) and "merchant" in § 2-104. Thus, a private individual purchasing
from another private individual might be a "good faith purchaser for value" but would
not be a "buyer in the ordinary course of business."
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title to the car although he and the "apparent owner" had jointly negotiated
with plaintiff for its purchase. The court impliedly ruled that objective
circumstances can be used to establish the lack of subjective "honesty in
fact" necessary for "good faith.'
0 4
This court applied the well established principal that one possessing
a voidable title is able to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser.
105
Although the earlier draft of the Code, which was applied in this case, did
not expressly so provide, the court assumed that delivery of the goods to a
purchaser who failed to comply with "cash sale" terms of a contract will
pass a voidable title. The Code now clarifies some troublesome contradictory
case law on this and other related questions10 6 by expressly providing that an
owner of goods transfers a voidable title if (1) it was agreed that the
transaction was to be a "cash sale"; (2) the transferor was deceived as to
the identity of the purchaser; (3) delivery was in exchange for a check
which is later dishonored; or (4) delivery was procured through fraud
punishable as larceny under the criminal law.
10 7
The issue in Gricar v. Bairhalter'08 was whether the purchaser of a
motor vehicle from a used-car dealer should prevail over the actual owner
who, although retaining the certificate of title, had placed the car on the
dealer's lot and authorized its sale. The purchaser, otherwise in good faith,
had ignored the conspicuous notice on the title transfer form which required
that the application be attached to the assigned certificate of title. The court
concluded that the owner's delivery of the vehicle to the dealer constituted
"entrusting" which, under the Code, includes "any delivery and any acquies-
cence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed be-
tween the parties .... -109 The court ruled that the defendant purchaser
should prevail under Section 2-403(2) which provides that "any entrusting
of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business." While the parties agreed that the used car dealer was
included within the Code terminology "merchant who deals in goods of that
kind,"110 they disagreed on whether the defendant was a "buyer in the
ordinary course of business." This latter requirement was defined, under the
Code as then in effect, as "a person who buys goods in the ordinary course
from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind....
104. "Good faith" is defined in § 1-201(19) of the U.C.C. as "honesty in fact in
the conduct of the transaction concerned."
105. Note, however, that a person with a void title, as in the case where a thief
sells stolen goods, passes no title. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
106. VOLD, SALES, § 79 at 401-2 (1959).
107. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1) (a), (b), (c) and (d).
108. 105 Pitt. L.J. 399, 11 D.&C.2d 723 (Pa. 1957).




The court ruled that defendant's failure to insist on receipt of a
certificate of title at the moment the truck was transferred to him was not
unusual in this type of transaction, and that his purchase of the truck was
"in the ordinary course" of his business. The Code now provides that
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means "a person who in good faith
and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys [goods] in ordi-
nary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind .... "I" (Emphasis added.) This clarifies the earlier language by
expressly providing that a buyer who has only constructive notice of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party will prevail.
112
Independent News Co. Inc. et al. v. Harry Williams a1 3 involved a
contract between a distributor of magazines and its wholesalers which
recited that the distributor would reimburse the wholesaler for any unsold
material if the latter would tear off and return the cover page and destroy
or mutilate the remainder. The contract further provided that title was
to remain in the distributor until the magazines were so mutilated as to be
unsaleable. In addition, the wholesalers were only permitted to sell the
mutilated copies as waste paper and were obligated to obtain a similar
written promise from the salvage buyer. Because quantities of coverless,
yet readable magazines, were turning up in the possession of vendors of
second-hand books, this action was initiated by three plaintiffs (a holder of
copyrights and trademarks in the magazines, the publisher, and the dis-
tributor thereof) to permanently enjoin the further sale of such materials. 
1 4
The court held that the reservation of title by the plaintiff-distributor con-
tained in the wholesalers' contracts had no effect upon the defendent who,
having obtained the magazines from waste-paper dealers, had no knowledge
of the restricted right of resale. Since the plaintiff-distributor had permitted
the wholesalers to retain possession of the "magazines," the court cited
Section 2-403(3) and impliedly ruled that such constituted an "entrusting"
under the Code. In as much as the books were purchased in good faith in the
ordinary course of his business from a merchant in the business of selling
such materials, the defendant therefore qualified for the protection provided
by Section 2-403(2) and acquired good title to the goods.
111. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
112. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) provides that knowledge must be actual while notice may
be actual or constructive.
113. 184 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa. 1960).





BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
Rightful Rejection, Acceptance and Revocation of Acceptance
There has been litigation concerning the exercise of dominion and con-
trol by buyers over goods, raising the question of whether such action con-
stituted acceptance, 1 5 and thus invalidated an attempted rejection 16 or
revocation of acceptance."
7
The buyer in Grucella v. General Motors Corp."5 revoked his accept-
ance of an automobile and erroneously claimed a breach of warranty. The
court concluded that his refusal to tender overdue installment payments
constituted a default since the defect in the car was minor and the non-
conformity did not substantially impair its value. It therefore held that the
alleged breach of warranty was not sufficient grounds for revocation of his
acceptance. 1 9 Disregarding a contractual provision requiring immediate
payment of "full purchase price on default by buyer," the court gave him the
opportunity to recover his repossessed vehicle on condition that he imme-
diately tender all overdue payments and make future installment payments
when due.' 0 The court also noted that even if the nonconformity were
assumed to substantially impair the value of the car, the attempted revoca-
tion of acceptance would be ineffective since, under Section 2-602(2) (a), a
buyer who rejects or revokes acceptance is under a duty not to excercise any
rights of ownership over the goods inconsistent with the rights of the seller.
Such wrongful ownership, the court concluded, had been excercised in this
case since the buyer, in approximately two months subsequent to the
attempted revocation of acceptance, had driven more than three thousand
115. U.C.C. § 2-606.
116. U.C.C. § 2-602.
117. U.C.C. § 2-608.
118. 10 D.&C.2d 65 (Pa. 1956).
119. Supra note 117. U.C.C. § 2-608 provides that "a buyer may revoke his
acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its
value to him. ... This should be compared with U.C.C. § 2-601 which sets a rigid
standard for performance. If the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract the buyer may:
(a) reject the whole;
(b) accept the whole;
(c) accept any commercial unit and reject the rest.
Other provisions which mitigate the strict performance requirements are found in §§ 2-504
(Shipment to Seller), 2-508 (Cure by Seller of Improper Delivery; Replacement),
2-612 ("Instalment Contract"; Breach); 2-614 (Substituted Performance).
120. In the Comments to U.C.C. § 9-506, Debtor's Right to Redeem Collateral,
the Code draftsmen point out that "The debtor must tender fulfillment of all obligations
secured, plus certain expenses: If the agreement contains a clause accelerating the entire
balance due, the entire balance would have to be tendered." The text of the U.C.C.
itself is ambiguous on this point in providing that "the debtor or any secured party
may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering
fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral ......
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miles and had, in addition, used the car in his business until the time of
repossession.
12 1
In Sincavage v. Howells122 seller sued buyer for the purchase price of
raw materials which buyer had processed and sold as a finished product.
Buyer counter-claimed on the theory that, although the goods in question
were received, plaintiff-seller had represented the materials to be suitable
for manufacture of rubber stamp handles and, relying on these represen-
tations, defendant-buyer had made the materials into such handles. Upon
delivery to a purchaser, they were rejected and returned as unfit. The court
held that the buyer would be deemed to have accepted the raw materials and
liable for the price absent the showing of a timely rejection, 12 3 or that his
action was for warranty damages and that due notice of a latent defect had
been given. It deferred final judgment and gave the buyer an opportunity
to amend his pleadings to clarify his counter-claim theory, to specify the
circumstances under which discovery of the defect was made, and when and
how notice had been given to the seller.
In deciding what constitutes a reasonable time within which rejection
or revocation of acceptance must occur, the court will consider all the cir-
cumstances of a transaction including the patent or latent nature of the defect
and the seller's need for prompt action due to factors such as the perishable
nature of the goods or fluctuations in the price. In Dearborn Stove Co. v.
Clark Appliance Co.,' 24 the court, relying on Sections 2-602 and 2-606, ruled
that a buyer, who used a drying machine for seven and one-half months be-
fore notifying the seller of a malfunction therein, had accepted the goods. A
subsequent rejection of the defective machine was, therefore, nugatory.
L & N Sales Co. v. Stuski125 held that whether a rejection or revocation of
acceptance occurred within a reasonable time was a question of fact for a
jury where, after six weeks use of measuring devices attached to liquor
bottles and several unsuccessful attempts by the seller to make them work
properly, the buyer rescinded.
121. The buyer joined as defendants, the manufacturer, who originally sold the
vehicle, and the finance company, who was the assignee of the conditional sales contract,
on the theory that the seller was an agent of these parties. The court ruled that no
agency existed in either case. In ruling that no defect serious enough to constitute a
breach of warranty had occurred, it thereby avoided the privity of contract issue. It
also struck down the buyer's claim against the assignee that it had a security interest
in the vehicle for the down payment paid to the seller. U.C.C. § 2-711(3). Under
U.C.C. § 9-206(1), an assignee of a conditional sales contract takes subject to the buyer's
defenses against the assignor.
122. 47 Luz. Leg. Reg. 186, 8 D.&C.2d 515 (Pa. 1957).
123. U.C.C. § 2-602(1) provides: "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable
time after their delivery or tender." U.C.C. § 2-606(1) (b) provides: "(1) Acceptance
of goods occurs when the buyer . . . (b) fails to make an effective rejection ... "
124. 104 Pitt. L.J. 403 (Pa. 1956).
125. Supra note 88.
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In Lang v. Fleet126 the buyer purchased an ice cream freezer under an
installment contract providing for a confession of judgment in the event of
the buyer's default. Upon default, the seller replevied the freezer and sold
it, applying the proceeds to the amount due under the installment sales
contract. While the freezer was in the buyer's possession (approximately
two years) it was moved from its original location and the compressor unit
was disconnected therefrom and used to power an air conditioner. After
seller's replevin action and sale, buyer filed a complaint alleging that the
equipment was defective and wholly unusable for the purposes intended,
and demanded damages and return of that portion of the purchase price paid.
Seller subsequently confessed judgment on the balance of the purchase price
still unpaid and buyer filed a petition to open judgment and consolidate
the two actions. The superior court, in refusing to open judgment, ruled
that the buyer had forfeited his right to rescind because of his exercise of
dominion over the goods. Citing Sections 2-602 and 2-606 of the Code the
court stated :
In the instant case the defendant exercised dominion over the com-
pressor unit by using it to operate an air conditioner. This is com-
pletely inconsistent with the seller's ownership. . . . The seller
never accepted or agreed to a rescission by the defendant. There-
fore under the cited provision of the commercial code the buyer is
deemed to have accepted the goods and is precluded from unilater-
ally effecting a rescission of the sales contract.'
27
The court properly ruled that the attempted rejection was ineffective
since the Code provides that "acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes
rejection of the goods accepted.' 128 However, since buyer had petitioned
to combine his request to open judgment with his complaint for damages
and return of the purchase price based on defects in the goods sold, the court
should have also expressly determined whether or not a breach of warranty
had occurred and whether buyer gave seller timely notice thereof. The Code
clearly provides on this point that "acceptance of itself does not impair any
other remedy provided by this article for non-conformity."' 129 The court
merely noted that the installment contract involved the sale of merchandise
"as is," leaving the reader to infer that in all probability no express or im-
plied warranties were given.
130
In Schmidt v. Cawthray,"' a car was purchased and warranted as being
"in perfect working condition," and "good running condition." Actually,
126. 193 Pa. Super. 365, 165 A.2d 258 (1960).
127. Id. at 366, 165 A.2d 258.
128. U.C.C. § 2-602.
129. U.C.C. § 2-607(2).
130. U.C.C. § 2-316(3).
131. 20 Leigh. L.J. 187 (Pa. 1961).
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because of oil leakage, it turned out to be inoperable four days after it was
purchased. The seller, after notification by the buyer concerning the vehicle's
breakdown, towed it to his garage where repairs were made. Buyer de-
manded possession of the automobile and seller refused, pending payment of
towing and storage costs. In an action by buyer to recover the purchase
price paid, the court held that the buyer had made claims inconsistent with
his theory of recovery, i.e., recission, by demanding possession of the vehicle
after its repair. The buyer's attempt to revoke acceptance some five
months after the sales transaction took place was, therefore, untimely and
ineffective. The court however awarded the buyer damages for breach of
warranty measured by the difference between the value of the car at the
time and place of acceptance and its value as warranted.1' 2 This is a proper
result since failure to seasonably reject goods or revoke acceptance thereof
is not synonymous with waiver of a right to warranty damages. Sec-
tion 2-607(3) so provides, if within a reasonable time the buyer discovers




Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency
The "remedies" provisions of the Sales Article of the Code that have
been litigated involve: The effect of a buyer's bankruptcy on the seller's right
to reclaim goods received by a buyer while insolvent; the validity of contract
provisions which give the seller a right to repossess on default coupled with
a right to the purchase price; buyer's right to specific performance; clauses
limiting warranty damages to the replacement of defective parts; and proof
of consequential damages.
In the Matter of Harry Kravitz and Jacob Rovner13 4 the bankrupt buyer
had received goods on credit while insolvent. After delivery and within ten
days of receipt of the goods by the bankrupt buyer, 3 5 but subsequent to the
filing of the buyer's bankruptcy petition, the seller demanded the return of
the goods. The seller then filed a petition for reclamation of the goods from
the bankrupt buyer's trustee. The court denied the petition on the grounds
that under Section 2-702(1)(b),136 the seller's right to reclaim the goods
132. U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
133. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (a).
134. 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1960).
135. U.C.C. § 2-702 provides: "Where the seller discovers that his buyer received
goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods on demand within ten days
after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of insolvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not
apply." In this latter case the seller may reclaim them on demand within a reasonable
time.
136. This provision now appears within U.C.C. §§ 2-702-(2) and (3).
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"is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course" or "lien creditor."
Since Section 9-301(3) expressly includes a "trustee in bankruptcy from
the date of filing of the petition" within the definition of "lien creditor,'
1 37
the trustee's right to the goods was superior to that of the seller. Judge
Goodrich found no inconsistency between these Code provisions and Sec-
tion 70(c) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act which gives to the trustee all
the rights of a lien creditor as of the date of filing the petition in bank-
ruptcy, "whether or not such a creditor actually exists." 13 He concluded
that "while section 70, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act makes the trustee an
ideal lien creditor, what such a lien creditor gets is determined by the law
of the state involved."'139  In the absence of Code provisions governing the
rights of a lien creditor over a defrauded seller the court applied local
authority to establish that under Pennsylvania law a seller's right of rescis-
sion is subject to the right of a lien creditor who extended credit subsequent
to the sale.1
40
Metropolitan Distributors v. Eastern Supply Co.1 4 1 also involved a
seller's right to reclaim goods under Section 2-702.142 The receivers argued
that Section 2-702 requires sellers not merely to demand return of the goods,
but to physically "reclaim" them within ten days after receipt by the buyer.
The court ruled that the section required "demand rather than physical
reclamation by the seller," and that a contrary conclusion would "force ven-
dors to devious means to gain physical possession of the goods within the
ten day period"'143 and would require possession, which is the object of the
suit, to be a prerequisite to obtaining the goods.
144
It was also argued by the receiver that Section 2-702 was not applicable
137. U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
139. Supra note 134 at 822.
140. Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 27 Atl. 300 (1893) ; Mann v. Salsberg,
17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901). U.C.C. § 1-103 provides that "Unless displaced by the
particular provision of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
141. 21 D.&C.2d 128 (Pa. 1959).
142. The court preliminarily rejected seller's argument that insolvency and ap-
pointment of receivers for the buyer on March 24, 1958, prior to his receipt of the goods
on March 28, 1958, constituted an anticipatory breach of contract thus entitling the
seller to rescind the contract and reclaim the goods. It ruled that since the seller was
only required to deliver the goods to a carrier and not to make delivery at destination,
title passed under U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (a) at the time and place of shipment on March
21, before the appointment of receivers for the buyer. Seller therefore had completed
his performance prior to the insolvency or appointment of receivers for the buyer,
and these events could not constitute an anticipatory breach of the contract. The court
also ruled that since the contract was fully executed by the seller before the receipt
and acceptance by the receiver, there were no grounds for rescission since neither the
buyer nor his receiver had willfully made fraudulent misrepresentations as to the buyer's
insolvency.




because it constituted a preference under the Federal Bankruptcy Act in
cases where constructive, as distinguished from actual fraud, exists. The
court did not dispose of this phase of the argument, but noted the possible
conflict between this section and the preference provisions of the Federal
Bankrutpcy Act. It concluded that, absent the preference issue, the seller
would prevail over the buyer under Section 2-702. However, it ruled that
it would be more judicious to have the issue resolved by the District Court
of Western Pennsylvania which had the buyer's petition in bankruptcy cur-
rently before it.' 41
In the past where the buyer has obtained the goods from the seller by
actual fraud, the preference provisions of the Banrkuptcy Act have not
barred reclamation by the seller from the trustee in bankruptcy. 146  Sec-
tion 2-702, however, does not make actual fraud by the buyer a condition
precedent to the seller's right of reclamation, but only requires insolvency
of the buyer at the time of the receipt of the goods and a subsequent demand
for the goods within ten days. It is possible that the courts might hold that
such a reclamation by a seller would constitute a transfer by the bankrupt
of assets in payment of an antecedent debt, voidable by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy as a preference providing the other preference requirements were
met. 147 Until this point is clarified, it would seem wise for sellers under
Section 2-702 to protect their interest in the goods by complying with the
filing requirements of Article 9 of the Code.' 4 They would then acquire
preferred status as secured parties even in the event of bankruptcy
proceedings.'
49
Specific Remedies and Damages; Limitation of Remedies
In Denkin v. Sterner, 50 plaintiff entered into a contract for the sale of
refrigeration equiment which buyer planned to use in a food market. Before
delivery, buyer cancelled the order. Seller then entered a confession of
judgment for the full amount of the purchase price. The contract provided
that "This agreement may be cancelled by the seller at any time before
delivery of the property to the purchaser." Even though the buyer received
145. As of this writing the decision has not been reported by the District Court.
146. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUpTcY, 70.41, n.16 at 1322, 1323 (14th ed. 1959). For a
comprehensive discussion, see Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518 (1960).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).
148. U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-302.
149. A similar problem will arise with § 2-502 which gives a buyer a security
interest in goods in the seller's possession which have been identified to the contract
if the seller has become insolvent within ten days after payment of the first installment
and the buyer tenders any unpaid portion of the purchase price. The buyer also can
avoid the preference problems in event of bankruptcy by utilizing the filing provisions
of Article 9. The definition of security interest in U.C.C. § 1-201(37) states that
"A buyer may also acquire a security interest by complying with Article 9."
150. 10 D.&C.2d 203 (Pa. 1956).
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no similar right, the court did not void the contract for lack of mutuality. The
contract also gave seller, in the event of default by purchaser, a right to
replevy the goods and to enter judgment for the full amount of the unpaid
purchase price plus interest, costs, and 15 per cent for attorney fees. Despite
this provision, the court ruled that the seller was not entitled to recover the
purchase price. Citing Section 2-709, it concluded that an action for the
purchase price under the Code is limited to cases where resale of the goods
is impracticable, unless the buyer has accepted the goods or they have been
destroyed after risk of loss has passed to the buyer. The seller, in this case,
had not proven that a reasonable effort to resell had been made, and the
circumstances did not indicate that such an effort would have been unavail-
ing. The court pointed out that to permit seller to recover the purchase price
where the goods have not been delivered would constitute an unconscionable
modification of the Code contract remedies under Section 2-719. In addition,
it would be a liquidated damages clause, void as a penalty under Sec-
tion 2-718. Nevertheless, the court noted that seller was entitled to
damages since buyer admitted that the reason for repudiation of the contract
was the availability elsewhere of similar equipment at a lower price. How-
ever, the court granted defendant's petition to open judgment on the theory
that it would be unconscionable to permit plaintiff-seller to recover the full
amount of the purchase price without any showing as to what goods might
have been identified to the contract and what goods were readily resaleable.
Mack v. Coogan51 held that while fair and reasonable incidental ex-
penses incurred in the care and custody of rightfully rejected goods are
recoverable by a buyer, the seller is entitled to have these items of damage
and any salvage value of rejected goods itemized and specially pleaded. The
basis of this action, brought by the buyer, was the breach of express and
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness arising out of the sale of
a boat. The court ruled that the complaint, which alleged that the seller had
represented that the boat would "be completely ready for the water" and
that the boat sank on launching after delivery, sufficiently set forth the
breach of warranty claim. However, it concluded that under Section 2-715
of the Code, the seller was entitled to a more specific complaint with refer-
ence to the cost of transporting the boat to the launching site, the cost of
labor to recover it after it had sunk, the expense of travel to arrange for
return of the boat, and its salvage value.
In McCormick Dray Line, Inc. v. Lowell1 52 buyer was granted specific
performance for the sale of a transportation business including certificates
of public convenience. The court ruled that plaintiff's actual damages would
be impossible to calculate precisely and, therefore, no adequate remedy at law
151. 8 Chest. Co. Rep. 233 (Pa. 1957).
152. 13 D.&C.2d 464 (Pa. 1957).
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existed. It cited Section 2-716 of the Code which provides that "specific
performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances." This provision broadens the specific performance rights
of the buyer by omittihg the requirement of the Uniform Sales Act that the
goods be specific and ascertained. The Code Comments to Section 2-716
also indicate that the phrase "unique or in other proper circumstances" is
not limited to heirloom or priceless works of art, etc., but is to be measured
in terms of the buyer's ability to obtain "cover," i.e., substitute goods. For
instance, output and requirements contracts, involving a particular or
peculiarly available source of market, are cited by the Comments as an
example of "unique" goods.
In an action for purchase price, the court in Evans Mfg. Corp. v.
Wolosin15 3 sustained a contract provision which limited seller's damages
for breach of warranty to replacement of defective parts. In denying the
buyer's counterclaim for damages, the court ruled that the contract lan-
guage1 54 which limited damages to replacement of defective parts was specific
enough to fall within Section 2-719(1) of the Code which provides that:
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods
and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of the
non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the
sole remedy.
Terms in this contract, specifying that "this warranty is in lieu of any or
all warranties stated or inferred, etc.," were probably an attempt by its drafts-
man to comply with Section 2-719(1)(b). It should be noted, however,
that a general provision excluding all warranty liability would not be suffi-
cient to exclude or modify warranties under Section 2-316 of the Code.
It would thus be desirable when drafting a contract provision limiting
damages for breach of warranty to incorporate the language "as is," or the
equivalent thereto, which is suggested by Section 2-316. The courts have
already indicated a strong inclination toward a requirement of clear and
unambiguous notice to the buyer of any disclaimer or limitations of warranty
153. 47 Luz. Leg. Reg. 238 (Pa. 1957).
154. "All parts sold . . . are free from original defects in materials and workman-
ship. [Seller] agrees to replace satisfactory, free of charge, any parts found, defective
under normal use and service for a period of one year from date of original sale by it.
This warranty is in lieu of any and all warranties stated or inferred, and all other
obligations on the part of the manufacturer, which neither assumes nor authorizes any-




liability by a seller. The contract draftsman is thus faced with a dilemma
in that he nmst provide adequate notice to the buyer without creating the
impression that the seller's product is likely to be defective.
In Magar v. Lifetime, Inc. 155 defendant, a corporation engaged in the
"home improvement business," agreed to "supply plastic plastering" to
the walls of the plaintiff's cement block house. It warranted the materials
and workmanship for a period of one year, but expressly limited any
damages which might result from a breach thereof "to the replacement or
correction of said defective material and/or installation." The superior
court, in reversing the judgment of the lower court which had granted
plaintiff full recovery of the contract price, agreed that a breach of warranty
had been proven. However, the court felt that "plaintiff's proofs did not
establish the extent of the damage for which defendant was solely responsible,
nor the cost of the repairs made necessary by the defective work." A new
trial was thus granted to enable plaintiff to submit evidence pertaining
to the extent of his damages.
It should be noted that the contract in the Magar v. Lifetime case was
not a contract for the sale of goods, but rather a construction contract. The
court relied on Section 399, Comment (g) of the Restatement of Contracts,
as primary authority for sustaining the validity of the limitation of damages
clause. However, it also cited Section 2-719 as authority by way of analogy.
This is important because it indicates that through such use by analogy,
the Code, over a period of years, may acquire authoritative value in the
general field of contract law over and above transactions which strictly
qualify as "sales." ' 56
The supreme court in Wynnebrook Bus Lines v. Rubin Bus Lines'
held that evidence of a prior oral intentional misrepresentation regarding
the number of fares handled by the seller's bus lines and the condition of
its buses would not be excluded by the parole evidence rule. The court
ruled that it is always permissable to prove that a written contract was
induced by fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts which do not
themselves become a part of the agreement. The purpose in such a case is
not to alter or vary the terms of the writing by parole evidence, but rather
155. 187 Pa. Super. 143, 144 A.2d 747 (1958).
156. Application of U.C.C. provisions by analogy may be particularly important
in these cases where the Act has modernized the old common law contracts law. For
example, see U.C.C. §§ 2-204 (Formation in General), 2-205 (Firm Offers), 2-206
(Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract), 2-207 (Additional Terms in Ac-
ceptance or Conformation), 2-208 (Course of Performance or Practicable Construction),
2-209 (Modification, Rescission and Waiver), 2-210 (Delegation of Performance, As-
signment of Rights). U.C.C. § 2-305 on open price terms is also a change in the old
common law of contracts. Generally these changes merely bring the old law up to
date with commercial practices that have long been used by business men.
157. 399 Pa. 363, 160 A.2d 599 (1960).
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to strike the writing down as though never existing. In permitting the plain-
tiffs to rescind the contract the court stated:
There is a monumental distinction between a representation on a
contractual item to be included in the written agreement and a
representation made on something unconnected with the written
agreement but constituting an inducement to the agreement. In
the case at bar the defendants cited statistics which were not to be
incorporated into, nor in any way made part of, the agreement so
that the parol evidence heard by the Chancellor on the subject
was not an attack intended to alter or modify a contract. It was
evidence aimed at striking down the contract itself because induced
by fraud. Fraud is a deadly acid which kills or cripples whatever
it touches.158
The supreme court overruled that portion of the lower court's decision
which awarded plaintiff damages for alleged loss of profits because plaintiff
had failed to establish that the cause thereof was defendant's misrepresen-
tation. Accordingly, it ruled that it was not called upon to interpret Sec-
tion 2-721 of the Code which provided that:
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all rem-
edies available under this article for nonfraudulent breach and
neither rescission of the contract for sale nor rejection or the
return of the goods bars the other remedies.
In restoring the status quo the supreme court sustained the lower
court's holding which permitted plaintiff to recover the funds expended
for the purchase of new buses which had to be acquired because the vehicles
supplied by the defendant were not in a useable condition as represented.
158. Id. at 366, 160 A.2d at 561.
